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J. S. MILL’S LIBERAL PRINCIPLE AND UNANIMITY
EDWARD J. GREEN
Abstract. The broad concept of an individual’s welfare is actually a cluster
of related specific concepts that bear a “family resemblance” to one another.
One might care about how a policy will affect people both in terms of their sub-
jective preferences and also in terms of some notion of their objective interests.
This paper provides a framework for evaluation of policies in terms of welfare
criteria that combine these two considerations. Sufficient conditions are pro-
vided for such a criterion to imply the same ranking of social states as does
Pareto’s unanimity criterion. Sufficiency is proved via study of a community
of agents with interdependent ordinal preferences.
1. Introduction
The broad concept of a person’s welfare is actually a cluster of related, specific
concepts. Economists have tended to focus attention almost exclusively on just one
of these specific concepts, which interprets questions regarding people’s welfare as
being about their subjective preferences. One might care also about some notion
of people’s objective interests. I use the term ‘objective interest’ to refer to any
specific notion of a person’s well-being that might be quantified by an index of
measurements of various aspects of the person’s situation.
Obviously there can be many distinct notions of a person’s objective interest. For
instance, some notions are based exclusively on the adequacy of a person’s access to
basic physical necessities, while other notions encompass social and psychological
aspects of the person’s situation as well. (Notably, Rawls’s (1971) characterization
of a person’s objective interest in terms of “primary goods” includes these broader
aspects.) It should be possible to design a satisfactory framework for evaluation of
policies in terms of welfare criteria based on notions of people’s objective interests,
and also in terms of criteria that combine considerations of objective interests and
preferences, just as neoclassical economists have succeeded in doing for preference-
based notions.
Moreover, once it is granted that there may several alternative concepts of welfare
that are all worthy of consideration in policy making, then some interesting general
questions arise concerning the relationships between them. Are there salient fea-
tures common to various specific notions of a person’s objective interest—analogous
to the ordinal features by which economists characterize preferences in an abstract,
general way—that might serve as a basis for economic analysis? If so, can any
general comparison be made between the conclusions of welfare analyses based
on various notions of objective interest possessing these features, or between the
conclusions of such an analysis and a neoclassical analysis based exclusively on
preferences? In particular, are there any interesting conditions under which all of
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2these various analyses would reach identical conclusions? This paper studies these
questions.
The main goal of the paper is to compare the neoclassical welfare criterion of
unanimous preference (formulated by Pareto (1909) and emphasized in welfare anal-
ysis by Wicksell (1935)) to an alternative criterion that is somewhat in the same
spirit, but that relies in an essential way on a notion of each person’s objective
interest as well as on a notion of persons’ preferences. The formulation of this
alternative criterion is suggested by John Stuart Mill’s discussion of liberalism.1
Mill emphasizes two connected ideas: that there is a notion of each person’s in-
terest that is distinct from that person’s preferences, and that a person ought to
be permitted to do as he pleases so long as he does not damage the interests (in
this non-preferential sense) of others (Mill 1859, Book I and Book IV). He extends
this idea of liberal permissibility to coalitions. That is, he proposes that a group
of people ought to be permitted to act unanimously as long as they do not damage
the interest of anyone outside the group. This proposal would license actions of
which the entire community approves, because the group that includes everyone
would act unanimously and there would be no outsider whose interest could be
damaged. Thus Mill’s criterion of liberally permissible action is at least as broad
as the Pareto-improvement criterion. Furthermore Mill states explicitly that he
interprets the notion of people’s interests narrowly enough so that some actions
would also be permissible although they were not unanimously approved. That
is, Mill takes the position that a person’s mere preference that an action should
not be taken does not make the action damaging to the person’s objective interest.
He proposes that someone should be permitted to take an action of which no one
else approves, as long as those others’ disapproval reflects such mere preferences
unconnected to their interests. On this interpretation, Mill’s proposed criterion of
liberal permissibility is strictly broader than the Pareto-improvement criterion.
The preceding discussion makes it clear that Mill’s views on liberally permissible
action are based on two separate considerations: a specific notion of what objective
interests people possess, and a general characterization of the relationship between
people’s objective interests and the permissibility of actions that other people might
wish to take. Thus someone might endorse Mill’s general characterization, but differ
with him about concrete cases on the basis of holding a different view of what are
people’s objective interests. (Indeed, someone might suppose contrary to Mill that a
mere preference does create a corresponding objective interest. When Mill’s general
characterization is interpreted according to that view, the resulting criterion is
simply a reformulation of the Pareto-improvement criterion.) The formal theory to
be presented here will emphasize the separation between Mill’s two considerations.
The main result to be proved is that, even in the context of an assumption about
the relationship between preferences and interests that is significantly weaker than
to posit an identification between them, Mill’s general characterization of liberal
permissibility coincides exactly with the Pareto-improvement criterion. This result
probably would have surprised both Mill and his philosophical critics. It shows
that the conflicts between some alternative welfare criteria are much less pervasive
1Mill’s thinking has also been influential in stimulating the formal investigation (beginning
with Sen 1970) of the problem of constraining Paretian welfare analysis to respect persons’ rights.
Schick (1980) and Riley (1988) have employed formal social-choice theory to interpret Mill’s
political philosophy as a whole.
3than might have been believed. However it does identify some particular situations
(namely, those in which the relationship between preferences and welfare assumed
in the theorem are implausible) in which the liberal and Paretian criteria are likely
to lead to different conclusions.
2. The setting of the problem
In order to examine carefully the logic behind Mill’s suggestion that his liberal
principle permits a wider class of actions than just those that accomplish unani-
mously preferred changes, I am going to restate the suggestion in language that
is parallel to that of neoclassical welfare economics. There a person’s preferences
are represented formally by a binary relation that may hold between social states,
which in turn represent possible situations of the community. A person’s objective
interest can also be also be represented formally by a binary relation between so-
cial states. As in the case of preferences, a distinct relation is identified with each
person or agent in the community.
In welfare economics, the relation of unanimous preference (often called the
“Pareto-improvement relation”) is defined from the preference relations of individ-
uals. Specifically, one social state is the unanimous successor of another, status-quo
social state if every agent prefers the change to it from the status quo, with at least
one agent’s preference being strict. Analogously, define a social state to be the
liberal successor of a status-quo social state if all members of some group of agents
prefer the change to it from the status quo, with at least one member of the group
having a strict preference, and if also the change does not reduce the welfare of any
agent outside the group. (In both of these definitions, I refer to one social state as
the status quo only to distinguish it from the other social state in the pair. I do
not mean to imply that it is historically determined or special in any other way.)
Using these definitions, Mill’s suggestion can be restated as the thesis that one
social state may be a liberal successor of another without necessarily being its
unanimous successor. Now I specify a formal theory in which this thesis can be
expressed. The aim of this theory is to characterize the logic of the thesis in a way
that is completely explicit, and that is also general in the sense of being independent
of specific proposals regarding what might constitute a person’s interest.
Consider a finite set I of agents, and a set X of social states. (i, j, and k will
range over I, and w, x, y, and z will range over X.) To each agent j are associated
two binary relations on X, Wj and Rj . When xWjy, this means that state x
provides for the objective interest of agent j as well as state y does. I will refer
to Wj as the interest relation, or simply the interest, of agent j. When xRjy, this
means that j weakly prefers x to y.
Define connectedness of a relation to mean that each pair of states is related in
at least one direction, and for each agent j, assume that
(1) Wj is transitive and reflexive, and Rj is transitive and connected.
Vj and Pj will denote the asymmetric (or strict) parts of Wj and Rj respectively.
Ej and Ij will denote the symmetric parts of Wj and Rj respectively.
Within this simple formal language, it is possible to state three substantive
conditions that may be placed on agents’ preferences. The first condition actually
guarantees three things: that each agent cares only about his own interest and
possibly the interests of others, that each agent prefers a social state that better
provides for his own interest if the interests of others are held constant, and that
4each interest relation is connected on any set of states on which all other agents’
interests are constant. Formally, for any agent j and for any states x and y,
(2) If ∀i 6= j xEiy, then [xWjy ⇐⇒ xRjy].
This will be referred to as the condition that preferences are based on interests.
Second, agent j will be called nonpaternalistic if his preferences are consonant
with his own interest and the preferences of others. Formally, j is nonpaternalistic
if, for all x and y,2
(3) If xWjy and ∀i 6= j xRiy, then xRjy.
The third condition that can be stated regarding an agent’s preferences is that his
preferences about trade-offs between the interests of agents within any one group in
the population are independent of the situation regarding interests of other agents
outside the group. Formally, agent i has preferences that are separable in interests
if for any partition of I into groups J and K and for any states w, x, y, and z,
(4) If ∀j ∈ J [wEjy and xEjz] and ∀k ∈ K [wEkx and yEkz],
then wRix ⇐⇒ yRiz.
Separability of preferences in interests will play an important technical role in
the arguments below. It is a necessary condition for an agent’s preferences to be
representable by a utility function that is a sum of functions that in turn are closely
related to his and other agents’ interest relations. Given the other assumptions that
have been made here, and a few others that will be introduced shortly, it is also
sufficient for the existence of such a representation. It should be noticed, though,
that separability is an assumption with a lot of substantive content. For example,
if each agent’s interest is taken to be his wealth, then it rules out the possibility
that an agent prefers small increases in wealth for others whenever they are poorer
than he is, but that (perhaps because of envy) he prefers that they should suffer
small decreases in wealth when they are richer than he is. This paper will conclude
with an example that shows that the liberal and unanimity relations may coincide
even when agents’ preferences are not separable in interests.
Three technical assumptions about the topological structure of the set of social
states, and of agents’ interest and preference relations, will also be needed. In
contrast to the separability assumption, these assumptions do not seem to raise
significant issues of interpretation. The meanings of the first two assumptions
are immediately obvious. The third assumption states that if Ej is viewed as a
correspondence, then it is lower hemicontinuous:
(5) X is a connected, separable topological space.
(6) For every agent j, Wj and Rj have closed graph in X
2.
(7) For every agent j, pair of states y and z, and neighborhood Z of z, if yEjz,
then there exists a neighborhood Y of y such that ∀y′ ∈ Y ∃z′ ∈ Z y′Ejz′.
2The use of ‘nonpaternalism’ for this condition is well entrenched in the literature on the
interdependent preferences. It is easy to think of examples in which the condition applies in
ways that intuitively have nothing to do with nonpaternalism, though. For example, Sen (1970),
considers a prude who would prefer to be the one to read Lady Chatterley’s Lover if anyone has
to read it at all,and someone else who would like to read the book but who maliciously would
even more enjoy forcing the prude to read it. Regarding someone who prefers that his own
welfare should be maximized certeris paribus, the condition formulated here is necessary, but not
sufficient, for the person’s preferences to be genuinely non-paternalistic.
5The unanimity and liberal relations now have to be defined. State x is a unani-
mous successor to y (and is also described as being Pareto superior to y or a Pareto
improvement of y) if
(8) ∀i xRiy and ∃j xPjy.
Define x to be a liberal successor of y if, for some coalition J ⊆ I,3
(9) ∀i ∈ J xRiy and ∃j ∈ J xPjy and ∀k 6∈ J xWky.
3. Mill and Pareto contrasted
At the close of section 1, I provided an informal summary of Mill’s liberal prin-
ciple. I pointed out the principle always countenances Pareto improvements. The
formal theory just set forth affords an explicit proof of this. In particular, taking
J = I in (9) yields (8), showing that the unanimous-succession relation is a subre-
lation of the liberal-succession relation. This is exactly the formal statement of the
assertion.
I also mentioned Mill’s thesis that his principle countenances some changes of
social state that are not Pareto improvements. I emphasized that the thesis follows
from his view that there is at most a very loose relationship between a person’s
preferences and his objective interest or even people’s objective interests in gen-
eral. However, in section 2 I have assumed that all agents have nonpaternalistic
preferences that are based on interests and separable in interests. These conditions
all relate preferences to interests. One might wonder whether these relationships
restrict the scope of the liberal principle so tightly that it must coincide exactly
with the Pareto principle. Because the conditions in section 2 have been specified
in an explicit and formal way, it is possible to construct an example that shows
definitely that the conditions do not imply that Mill’s principle and the Pareto
principle coincide. I will provide one such example next. This example should not
necessarily be interpreted to show that Mill’s thesis is incorrect, though. Rather it
shows that the conditions introduced in section 2 are weaker in some circumstances
than they might seem to be. After presenting the example. I will introduce some
further assumptions that rule out such degenerate circumstances. Once these as-
sumptions have been set forth, the stage will be set to examine the relationship
between Mill’s liberal principle and the Pareto principle. Now, here is the example
of a community in which the liberal-succession relation is much more inclusive than
the unanimous-succession relation.
Let I = {1, 2, 3, 4}, and let X be an interval of the real line. Suppose that
xR1y and xW2y if x ≥ y, and that xW1y and xR2y if x ≤ y. Let agent 3 be
3This relation of liberal succession is one of two possible ways (within the present theory) to
formalize Mill’s criterion for when a change of social state should be countenanced. The other
possibility would be to stipulate that a coalition may make any change of state that does not give
non-members strictly lower levels of welfare than they previously enjoyed. That is, x could be
defined to be a liberal successor of y if, for some coalition J ⊆ I,
(9′) ∀i ∈ J xRiy and ∃j ∈ J xPjy and not ∃k 6∈ J yVkx.
In general, (9′) defines a more permissive (i.e., set-theoretically larger) relation than does (9).
However, (9) and (9′) define the same relation if all welfare relations Wj are connected. While
connectedness is not assumed directly, it is implied by other assumptions that will be used here
(cf. lemma 6 below).
6identical to agent 1, and agent 4 to agent 2. It is easily verified that all of the
assumptions (1)–(7) are satisfied. However, no pair of social states is related by the
unanimous-succession relation, but every pair of distinct social states is related by
the liberal-succession relation.
In this example, the assumptions (2) and (3) of interest-based preference and
nonpaternalism have been trivialized. That is, each assumption is an implication
with a hypothesis that is never satisfied. Now I will define four conditions which
are intended to identify environments that are rich enough for the two assumptions
to have nontrivial content. Note that the example above does not satisfy any of
these conditions.
First, agents’ interests will be said to have product structure if 4
(10) ∀{xi}i∈ I ∃y ∀i yEixi.
Second, agent i will be said to have idiosyncratic interest if
(11) ∃x ∃y [xViy and ∀j 6= i xEjy].
Third, analogously, agent i will be said to have idiosyncratic preferences if
(12) ∃x ∃y [xPiy and ∀j 6= i xIjy].
Fourth, it will be said that an unambiguous improvement is possible if
(13) ∃x ∃y ∀i [xViy and xPiy].
4. Agents’ judgments and interpersonal
agreement regarding interests
Taken together, assumptions (2) that agents’ preferences are based on interests
and (4) that agents’ preferences are separable in interests have an interpetation
that each agent’s preferences are based on considerations of trade-offs between his
own interest and other agents’ interests. (There might well be other possible in-
terpretations of agents’ preferences as well.) The idea of making trade-offs among
interests implies that the difference between the degree to which an agent’s inter-
est is satisfied in two distinct states is conceived as being a cardinal magnitude.
Moreover, agents may either agree or disagree with one another about comparisons
between these magnitudes. This is a subtle point, and it is also an important one
for the welfare analysis which is to follow. Therefore let us consider it carefully
now.
Consider two agents i and j, each of whose interest is completely determined by
what kind of house he lives in. Suppose that there are four types of house—hovels,
4It would be desirable to make only an assumption to the effect that there is some latitude for
agents’ interests to vary independently. The present, inordinately strong, assumption is made in
order to invoke a theorem of conjoint measurement theory below. Krantz, et. al. ((1971), pp. 275-
6) discuss the general need to have a theory of measurement based on a weaker assumption. Thus
the objectionable feature of the present assumption seems to be a convenient technical fiction
that need not be viewed as limiting the validity of the results to be derived here. Of course,
social states must be viewed as conceptually possible profiles of interests that are not necessarily
technically feasible to satisfy all at once.
7cottages, mansions, and palaces—in increasing order of satisfaction of an agent’s
interest. Suppose that a social state is simply a specification of a type of house for
each agent.
The ordinal ranking of types of house determines the answers to some questions
regarding cardinal comparisons, such as “Would it make more difference for the
satisfaction of agent j’s interest if he were to move from a cottage to a palace than
if he were to move from a cottage to a mansion?” Clearly the former difference
is larger, since the two changes begin at the same point but the latter change
accomplishes only part (in terms of the ranking) of what the former accomplishes.
However, the ranking does not determine the answers to other questions such as
“Would it make a bigger difference for the satisfaction of agent j’s interest if he
were to move from a mansion to a palace, than if he were to move from a hovel to
a cottage?” That is because neither of the ordinal intervals described by these two
changes includes the other. If one were to represent the magnitudes of differences
in satisfaction of an agent’s interest as distances between points on a line, then
pictures like either of the following would be possible.
[hovel] [cottage] [mansion] [palace]
[hovel] [cottage] [mansion] [palace]
Information about agents’ preferences can be interpreted to represent the agents
as implicitly answering such questions, though. For example, consider the following
two pairs of states: x and y, and x′ and y′.
State x : Agent i lives in a mansion; Agent j lives in a mansion.
State y : Agent i lives in a cottage; Agent j lives in a palace.
State x′: Agent i lives in a mansion; Agent j lives in a hovel.
State y′: Agent i lives in a cottage; Agent j lives in a cottage.
Suppose that agent i strictly prefers state y to state x and also strictly prefers
state x′ to state y′. Then I will interpret agent i as judging that agent j’s interest
is affected more significantly by a move from a mansion to a palace than by a
move from a hovel to a cottage, in the following sense. Agent i would be willing
to bear the sacrifice of having to move from a mansion to a cottage in order to
enable j to move from a mansion to a palace, but he would be unwilling to bear
the same sacrifice in order to enable j to move from a hovel to a cottage. This pair
of preferences can be interpreted as reflecting a judgment on the part of i that a
move from a mansion to a palace would make a larger difference for the satisfaction
of j’s interest than would a move from a hovel to a cottage.
In an environment with many social states, this judgments-about-interests in-
terpretation of agents’ preferences will have restrictive implications. For example,
consider another two pairs of social states.
State w : Agent i lives in a cottage; Agent j lives in a mansion.
State z : Agent i lives in a hovel; Agent j lives in a palace.
8State w′: Agent i lives in a cottage; Agent j lives in a hovel.
State z′: Agent i lives in a hovel; Agent j lives in a cottage.
Suppose that i were strictly to prefer state w to state z and state z′ to state w′.
The interpretation of preferences as reflecting judgments about cardinal differences
in satisfaction of interests would suggest that i considers a move from a hovel to a
cottage to matter more for the satisfaction of j’s interest than would a move from
a mansion to a palace. The argument for this implication is the same as before,
except now i’s contemplated sacrifice is a move from a cottage to a hovel instead of
from a palace to a mansion. If i were to hold all of the preferences that have been
discussed in this paragraph and in previous one, then the judgments-about-interests
interpretation of preferences would impute two inconsistent judgments to him. I
will demonstrate later in this paper (in lemma 10) that the assumptions made in the
preceding two sections are sufficient to rule out such imputations of inconsistency.
Technically, in addition to the assumptions that have been introduced so far, lemma
10 also requires an additional double-cancellation condition in the case of two-agent
communities and of some larger communitites. This condition will be set forth
when the lemma is stated formally.
Agent j (or any other agent in the community) might either agree or disagree
with agent i’s assessments of how much difference various changes of social state
would make to the satisfaction of j’s interest. The main result to be proved in
this paper will be that, in the presence of the assumptions that have already been
made (along with the double-cancellation condition), the additional assumption
that agents always agree with one another about such assessments is sufficient for
the liberal-succession relation and the unanimous-succession relation to coincide.
5. Equivalence of the welfare criteria: a preliminary result
The model of a community set forth in sections 2 and 3 should seem familiar
in many respects, especially in relation to work of Debreu. As in Debreu (1960),
preferences of an individual agent are described in terms of ordinal and topological
assumptions along with an assumption regarding separability. As in Debreu (1959),
a welfare proposition regarding a community of agents described in such terms is
to be investigated.5 This investigation divides logically into two parts. First a
representation theorem should be proved, asserting the existence of well behaved
utility functions which represent agents’ preferences and also of analogous func-
tions which represent agents’ interests. Then, taking advantage of these numerical
representations, the proposition about welfare should be proved.
Since welfare analysis provides the motivation for the representation theorem,
and also since the particular set of assumptions studied here in this paper not be
the only ones which yield the sort of representation that is derived, I will begin by
formulating the representation that is needed and by proving that it implies that
the liberal-succession and unanimous-succession relations coincide.
Throughout this section and the remainder of the paper (except where explicitly
stated to the contrary), I will assume that conditions (1)–(6) and (10)–(13) hold.
The representation theorem that I will prove later from these assumptions (and
the two further ones discussed at the end of the preceding section) contains the
5Debreu (1959) did not impose separability, however.
9following three assertions (14)–(16) regarding the possibility of representing agents’
preferences and interests by numerical functions.6
(14) vj : X → R is continuous and ∀x ∀y [xWjy ⇐⇒ vj(x) ≥ vj(y)].
(15) pj : X → R is continuous and ∀x ∀y [xRjy ⇐⇒ pj(x) ≥ pj(y)].
(16) There exist scalars αij and κi such that ∀i ∀x pi(x) = Σj ≤nαijvj(x) + κi.
The first two of these assertions are just the sort of ordinal representations that
one would expect. (Note, however, that (14) implies the connectedness of interest
relations, which has not been assumed directly in (1).) The real force of the repre-
sentation is provided by assertion (16). What this assertion obviously accomplishes
is to reflect numerically the assumptions (2) and (4) that agents’ preferences are
based on interests and separable in interests. The assertion states significantly more
than that, though. Each agent’s preferences might individually be based on inter-
ests and separable in interests, and yet the numerical representation of someone’s
interest (agent i, say) that entered one agent’s (agent j) utility function might be an
arbitrary continuous, strictly increasing transformation of the numerical represen-
tation of i’s interests that entered another agent k’s utility function. Assertion (16)
states that the representation of i’s interest that enters j’s utility function must
be a strictly increasing affine transformation of the representation of i’s interest
that enters k’s utility function. This means that when the preferences of agents j
and k reflect cardinal comparisons of differences in satisfaction of i’s interest (such
as that it would make a greater difference for i to move from a hovel to a cottage
than it would make for him to move from the cottage to a mansion), then j and
k must agree with one another. As has already been explained in the preceding
section, the existence of such agreement throughout the community regarding car-
dinal intrapersonal comparisons across social states of each agent’s interest is a key
assumption of the proof that liberal succession and unanimous succession coincide.
This assumption does not follow from the assumptions about the community that
have been made so far. An ordinal assumption that does imply assumption (16)
(in the presence of the other assumptions) will be introduced below in section 8.
Now all of the assumptions have been introduced that are needed to prove the
coincidence of the liberal-succession and unanimous-succession relations. In the
proof, it will be convenient to write (16) in matrix form. To do so, define v : X → Rn
and p : X → Rn, where n is the number of agents in i, by
(17) ∀x ∀j [v(x)]j = vj(x)
and
(18) ∀x ∀j [p(x)]j = pj(x).
Let A be the matrix with coefficients αij . Then (16) can be written in matrix
notation as:
(19) ∀x p(x) = Av(x) + κ.
6The scalar κi in (16) could be eliminated if pi were adjusted by subtracting it. However, the
present formulation simplifies the proof of lemma 5 below.
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Now the proof of the welfare theorem will be presented in a series of lemmas.
Lemma 1. v(X) contains a non-empty open subset of Rn.
Proof. Let xjVjyj for each j, as is guaranteed by (11). By continuity of vj and
connectedness of X, the interval [vj(yj), vj(xj)] is a subset of vj(X). This interval
has nonempty interior, since vj representsWj . Since agents’ interests have product
structure, then, (v1(y1), v1(x1))× . . .× (vn(yn), vn(xn)) ⊆ v(X). 
Lemma 2. A is nonsingular.
Proof. By idiosyncracy of preferences, for each i there exist x and y; such that xPiy
and ∀j 6= i xIjy. Thus p(x)− p(y) = A[v(x)− v(y)] is a scalar multiple of the usual
basis vector in dimension i. 
Let B = (βij) = A
−1. Then, for every i there exists a scalar λi such that
(20) ∀x pi(x) = αiivi(v) +
∑
j 6= i
αij [
∑
k≤n
βjkpk(x)] + λi.
Equation (20) provides an implicit characterization of the preferences of agent i
in terms of i’s interest and other agents’ preferences. However, pi occurs on both
sides of the equation. In order to have an explicit characterization, pi should not
occur on the right. That is, the term
∑
j 6= i αijβjipi(x) should be subtracted from
both sides of (20), and then both sides of the resulting equation should be divided
by 1 −
∑
j 6= i αijβji. The result of these operations, defining γik =
∑
j 6= i αijβjk,
δii = αii / (1− γii), µi = λi / (1− γii), and δik = γik / (1− γii) for k 6= i, is
(21) ∀x pi(x) = δiivi(x) +
∑
k 6= i
δikpk(x) + µi.
There is one thing that has to be verified for this derivation of (21) to be sound.
That is that γii 6= 1. Otherwise, the final step of the derivation would have been
division by zero. This verification is now provided.
Recall once again, that by idiosyncracy of i’s preference, there exist states x and
y such that xPiy and ∀k 6= i xIky. By nonpaternalism, i’s strict preference requires
that xViy. Equation (15) implies that pk(x) = pk(y) for all k 6= i, so subtraction of
(20) from the corresponding equation for state y yields [pi(y)− pi(x)] =
αii[vi(y) − vi(x)] + γii[pi(y) − pi(x)]. By (14), [vi(y) − vi(x)] is strictly positive.
Therefore γii 6= 1 if αii 6= 0. However, if αii = 0, then it would follow from (11),
(14), (15) and (16) that yjRjxj (where xj and yj are the pair of states that (11)
guarantees to exist for j), contrary to (2).
Since γii 6= 1, then, preferences representable by (16) are also representable by
(21). This latter representation is now studied further.
Lemma 3. In (21), for every i, δii > 0.
Proof. By idiosyncracy of preferences, there exist x and y such that xPiy and
∀j 6= i xIjy. Thus, by nonpaternalism of i, xViy. Therefore δii > 0 follows from
(14), (15) and (21). 
Lemma 4. In (21), for every i and k, δik ≥ 0.
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Proof. By lemma 3, it is sufficient to prove this inequality for i 6= k. By lemma 1,
there exist a subset Y ⊆ X and a nonempty open set U ⊆ Rn such that v maps
Y onto U. By lemma 2, p(Y ) = A(U) is open in Rn. For in define qi : Y → Rn by
[qi(x)]j = δiivi(x) + µi if i = j, and [q
i(x)]j = pj(x) if i 6= j. Note that, by (21),
qi = Qip, where Qi is a matrix that will also be denoted by (χjk). This matrix is the
same as the identity matrix except for its ith row, and χii = 1 and χik = −δik for
k 6= i. It is obvious (using row i to expand the determinant) that Qi is nonsingular,
so qi(Y ) = QiA(U), which is open in Rn. Thus there exist states x and y such that
qi(x)−qi(y) is a positive scalar multiple of the usual basis vector in the k dimension.
That is, xEiy, xPky, and xIjy for all other agents j. By nonpaternalism of i, xRiy,
so δik ≥ 0 follows from (14), (15), and (21). 
These results have a useful geometric interpretation. Consider the vector space
that is obtained from the space of all continuous, real-valued functions on X when
functions that differ by a constant are identified with one another. Let V be the
finite-dimensional subspace generated by {vi}i∈ I . Lemma 1 asserts that V is iso-
morphic to Rn. For a set F of vectors in V, letK[F ] be the convex cone generated by
F. The possibility of an unambiguous improvement (i.e., assumption (13)) implies
that K[{vi}i∈ I ∪ {pi}i∈ I ] does not contain any linear subspace (except for {∅})
of V. Lemma 2 asserts that {pi}i∈ I is a basis of V. Lemma 4 asserts that, for each
i, pi ∈ K[{vi} ∪ {pj}j 6= i]. These facts are now used to establish the coincidence of
the two social-choice relations.
Theorem 1. The additively-separable representation of preferences discussed here
is sufficient for the Mill’s principle to be equivalent to the Pareto principle. Specif-
ically, suppose that the environment is as described in (1)–(6) and (10)–(13). If
agents’ interests and preferences can be represented as in (14)—(16), then Pareto
superiority and liberal succession coincide.
Proof. Since the Pareto relation is contained in the relation of liberal succession,
it is sufficient to prove that x is Pareto superior to y if x is a liberal succession of
y. A contradiction will be obtained from the contrary assumption. In particular,
assume that J ⊆ I satisfies (9) but that yPkx. Then pk ∈ K[{vi}i 6∈ J ∪ {pj}j ∈ J ].
Thus K[{vi}i 6∈ J ∪ {pj}j ∈ I ] is not a subset of K[{vi}i 6∈ J ∪ {pj}j ∈ J ]. By (13),
K[{vi}i 6∈ J ∪ {pj}j ∈ I ] contains no linear subspace (except {∅}) of V. Therefore,
by (12) and Corollary 18.5.2 of Rockafellar (1970), there is an agent k such that
pk 6∈ K[{vi}i 6∈ J ∪ {pj}j 6= k]. (Note that (12) rules out that pj could be a scalar
multiple of pk for any j 6= k.) This contradicts lemma 4, since k 6∈ J . 
6. Nonmalevolence
Theorem 1 has antecedents in the work of Bergstrom ((1971), (1989), (1988)),
Green ((1979), (1982)), and Pearce (1983), all of which assume some version of
(16). In the remaining part of this paper, it will be shown that the assumptions
on ordinal preference and interest relations that have been introduced above (along
with the double-cancellation condition and an ordinal assumption that will imply
agents’ agreement about intrapersonal interest comparisons) can replace (16) in
the theorem. Before showing this, though, I will now briefly discuss one difference
between theorem 1 and it antecedents. The remainder of the paper is independent
of this discussion.
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In the antecedent theorems just mentioned, the possibility of an unambiguous
improvement (13) has not been assumed but an additional assumption of nonmalev-
olence has been made. Formally, agent j is nonmalevolent if
(13′) ∀x ∀y [if ∀i xWiy, then xRiy].
Neither of assumptions (13) and (13′) implies the other. In particular, note that
the example in section 3 satisfies (13′) but not (13). To see that (13) does not
imply (13′), consider two agents and let X be the Euclidean plane, with v1(x) =
x1 and v2(x) = x2. Define p1 = 2v1 − v2 and p2 = 2v2 − v1. Obviously neither
preference relation defined by these utility functions satisfies (13′), but (1, 1) is an
unambiguous improvement over (0, 0).
Conditional on the other assumptions that have been made here, though, the
assumptions (13) and (13′) are equivalent. It is easy to see that the assumptions
of this paper (specifically (1), (4), (10), (11) and (13′)) imply (13). The converse
implication is proved analogously to theorem 1. Clearly (13′) implies that all of the
coefficients αij in (16) are nonnegative. Thus, if some agent j does not satisfy (13
′),
then pj 6∈ K[{vi}i∈ I ]. Thus K[{vi}i∈ I ∪ {pj}j ∈ I ] is not a subset of K[{vi}i∈ I ].
By (13), K[{vi}i∈ I ∪ {pj}j ∈ I ] contains only the trivial linear subspace {∅} of V, so
there is an agent k such that pk 6∈ K[{vi}i∈ I ∪ {pj}j 6= k]. This contradicts lemma
4, though, so the failure of (13′) for j implies the failure of (13). That is, if (13)
holds, then all agents must satisfy (13′).
7. Additive conjoint measurement of preference
The proof of theorem 1 has relied heavily on two assumptions that are not
obvious consequences of what had previously been assumed. The first of these is
assumption (14), that for each agent j there is a continuous function vj : X → R
such that ∀x ∀y [xWjy ⇐⇒ vj(x) ≥ vj(y)]. This assumption implies in particular
that agents’ interest relations are connected onX, which is a stronger connectedness
claim than the limited one that follows from assumptions (1) and (2). The other
assumption is (16), that the functions vj can be specified in such a way that there
exist scalars αij and κi such that ∀i ∀x pi(x) =
∑
j≤n αijvj(x) + κi.
7
These assumptions will be derived from ordinal and topological assumptions.
The first step to accomplish this is to formulate three conditions (i.e., (21) - (23)
below) that jointly imply (14) and (16). The first of these conditions will be estab-
lished in this section, and the second and third in the next.
Call a function f : X → R compatible with an equivalence relation E on X if,
for all x and y, xEy implies that f(x) = f(y). Say that f is strictly increasing
with respect to a binary relation V on X if, for all x and y, xV y implies that
f(x) > f(y). Note that (14) is equivalent to the statement that, for each j, there
is a continuous function vj that is both compatible with Ej and strictly increasing
with respect to Vj . The first of the three conditions incorporates this information
from (14) directly in a way that closely resembles (16). For all agents i and j, let
N(i) be a set of agents, let νi be a scalar, and let pi and uij be functions from X to
R. Condition (16) will be paraphrased by taking N(i) to be the set of j such that
αij 6= 0 and uij to be αijvj . Now the first two conditions can be stated:
7(14) resembles (13) and (18) in its form, but it follows routinely from previous assumptions,
using a result of Debreu (1959). The crucial difference is that Ri is assumed to be connected,
while the connectedness of Wi must be proved.
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(22) ∀i ∀x pi(x) =
∑
j ∈N(i)
uij(x) + νi, where each pi satisfies (15) and each
uij for j ∈ N(i) is continuous, non-constant, and compatible with Ej ,
and
(23) Each uij for j ∈ N(i) is strictly increasing with respect to Vj .
Conditions (22) and (23) do not quite imply (16), because (16) entails (according
to the paraphrase that has just been described) the third condition that8
(24) If j ∈ N(h) ∩ N(i), then there exist scalars σhij and τhij such that uhj =
σhijuij + τhij .
Lemma 5. Conditions (22) and (24) imply condition (16).
Proof. Consider a well ordering of I. For every j, define ι(j) to be the first i such
that j ∈ N(i). Note that ι(j) ≤ j (because j ∈ N(j) by (2), (11), and (22)). For
each h, define M(h) to be the union of the sets N(i) for i preceding h. For each j,
let vj = uι(j)j . Define αhj = σhι(j)j if j ∈ N(h) and ι(j) < h, αhj = 1 if ι(j) = h,
and αhj = 0 otherwise. Define κh = νh +
∑
j ∈M(h)∩N(h) τhι(j)j . It is routinely
verified that these definitions satisfy (16). 
The remainder of this section is devoted to deriving (22) as a consequence of
ordinal and topological assumptions. Besides the assumptions that have already
been stated, only one further assumption is needed. This assumption, called the
double-cancellation condition, strengthens the separability condition (4) in the case
of an agent whose preferences depend only on the interests of himself and one other
agent:
(25) If ∃i 6= j ∀x ∀y [xWiy and xWjy jointly imply that xRjy], then the follow-
ing condition holds for all states r, s, t, x, y, and z: if rRjx and sRjy and
if rWit, xWis, yWiz, rWjy, sWjt, and xWjz, then tRjz.
Like separability, this condition is necessary (even without any other assumptions)
for the existence of an additive conjoint representation. Note that the condition is
satisfied trivially if N(j) is not a two-element set.
Now it will be shown that the ordinal and topological assumptions that have been
made so far are sufficient to establish (22). The proof that (22) holds for agent i
depends on the cardinality of N(i). If N(i) has more than one element, then (22)
will follow from a representation theorem for additive conjoint measurement due to
Debreu (1959). If N(i) is a singleton (i.e., if i’s preferences depend only on his own
interest), then it is sufficient to take pi = uii = vi and νi = 0, where vi satisfies
(14). The existence of such a function vi is now established.
Lemma 6. Assumptions (1), (2), (5), (6), and (10) imply assumption (14), i.e.,
that for each agent j there is a continuous function vj : X → R such that
∀x ∀y [xWjy ⇐⇒ vj(x) ≥ vj(y)].
Proof. By a result of Debreu (1959), it is sufficient under these assumptions to show
that each Wj is connected on X. Consider any agent j and any pair of states x and
y. By (10), there exists a state z such that xEjz and ∀i 6= j yEiz. Either yRjz or
zRjy by (1), so either yWjz or zWjy respectively by (2). Then by (1), either yWjx
or xWjy respectively because xEjz. 
8σhij = αhj /αij and τhij = 0.
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In the case general that Ri and Wi may not coincide, the derivation of (22)
depends on Debreu’s representation theorem, which is now stated as lemma 7. For
a proof, see Debreu (1959), or Krantz, et al. (1971, §6.2, 6.11, 6.12). The continuity
of uij asserted in the lemma is not explicitly mentioned in those sources, but it is
clear from a careful inspection of Debreu’s proof, in which he has noted on pp.
22-24 that uij is obtained from a continuous function and that the several steps of
the construction of uij preserve continuity.
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Lemma 7 (Representation theorem for additive conjoint measurement). Suppose
that Ri 6=Wi and that assumptions (1) - (6), (11) and (25) are satisfied. Suppose
that X = Πj ∈ I Xj, where each Xj is a topological space and X has the product
topology, and that, for each j, ∀x ∀y [xj = yj implies xEjy]. Then ∀x pi(x) =∑
j ∈N(i) uij(x)+νi, where i ∈ N(i) ⊆ I, pi satisfies (15) and each uij for j ∈ N(i)
is continuous and non-constant and factors through Xj (i.e., Uij(x) depends only
on xj).
Lemma 7 falls short of the objective of this section in two respects. First, even
given the hypotheses of the theorem, the conclusion that each function uij factors
through Xj is weaker than the desired conclusion that each uij is compatible with
Wj . Second, the hypothesis that X is a cartesian product of spaces that individually
determine agents’ interest levels is stronger than the product-structure assumption
(10). The cartesian-product representation restricts the economic applicability of
the lemma to private-goods environments, since the level of provision of a public
good would be a coordinate of the social state that would affect the interests of all
agents. The conclusion of lemma 7 can actually be strengthened to include compat-
ibility of each uij with Ej , and the hypothesis of a cartesian-product representation
can be weakened to assumption (10) if (7) is also assumed. These amendments are
now made in lemma 8 and lemma 10.
Lemma 8. Suppose that assumptions (1) - (6), (11) and (25) are satisfied. Suppose
that X = Πj ∈ IXj , where each Xj is a topological space and X has the product
topology, and that, for each j, ∀x ∀y [xj = yj implies xEjy]. Then ∀x pi(x) =∑
j ∈N(i) uij(x)+νi, where i ∈ N(i) ⊆ I, pi satisfies (15) and each uij for j ∈ N(i)
is continuous, non-constant, and compatible with Ej .
Proof. Lemma 7 establishes everything except for the compatibility of uij with
Ej , and it establishes that each uij factors through Xj . A contradiction will be
derived from the assumption that, for some j ∈ N(i), uij is not compatible with
Ej . Specifically, suppose that xEjy but that uij(x) < uij(y). Let zj = xj but let
zh = yh for all h 6= j. Then ∀h zEhy, so zRiy by (2). However, pi(z) < pi(y),
contradicting (15). 
A technical result is needed in order to relax the cartesian-product hypothesis
to (10). Define a set Y of states to be saturated with respect to an equivalence
relation E if x ∈ Y whenever, for some y, y ∈ Y and xEy. Note that a function
is compatible with E if and only if its level sets are saturated with respect to E.
9Unlike Debreu’s proof, the proof given by Krantz, et al. does not assume the separability of
X, and it does not assert the continuity of the functions uij . I do not know whether the functions
constructed in that proof actually are continuous. Since continuity of the functions representing
agents’ interest relations was used in lemma 1 and will be used again in the next section, I have
asserted the separability of X in (6).
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It will be required that the property of saturation with respect to the relations Ej
should be preserved when topological closures are taken. Lemma 9 asserts that this
requirement can be met.
Lemma 9. If (1), (6), and (7) hold and Y is a set of states that is saturated with
respect to Ej , then cℓ(Y ) is saturated with respect to Ej .
Proof. Equation (1) entails that Ej is an equivalence relation. By (6), the graph of
Ej is closed. Suppose that cℓ(Y ) is not saturated with respect to Ej . Then there
exist states y ∈ cℓ(Y ) and x 6∈ cℓ(Y ) such that xEjy. Since x 6∈ cℓ(Y ), there is
an open set U containing x and disjoint from Y. By (7), there is an open set V
containing y and satisfying ∀v ∈ V ∃u ∈ U uEjv. Thus Y cannot be saturated with
respect to Ej , because Y ∩ V 6= ∅. 
Recall that if E is an equivalence relation on X, then the quotient space X /E
is the set of E-equivalence classes of elements of X, with the finest topology that
makes the mapping from elements to their equivalence classes continuous.
Lemma 10. Suppose that assumptions (1)–(7), (10), (11) and (25) are satisfied.
Then ∀y pi(x) =
∑
j ∈N(i) uij(x) + νi, where i ∈ N(i) ⊆ I, pi satisfies (15) and
each uij for j ∈ N(i) is continuous, non-constant, and compatible with Ej . That
is, (22) is satisfied.
Proof. Begin by defining xEIy if and only if ∀i xEiy. Obviously Ei is an equivalence
relation and each Wi induces a relation on X /EI . By (2), each Ri also induces
a relation on X /EI . (‘Wi’ and ‘Ri’ will denote the relations on X /EI , as well
as the relations on X). There are functions vi and pi satisfying (14) and (15) by
lemma 6 and (Debreu (1959)), respectively, and these induce functions from X /EI
to R that are compatible with Ei (resp. Ii) and strictly increasing with respect
to Vi (resp. Pi). The induced functions are continuous by Bourbaki (1965, I.3.4,
Prop. 6). Thus the induced functions satisfy (14) and (15) relative to the induced
relations on X /EI . Therefore the relations Ri andWi on X /Ei have closed graph.
Now, for each i, define Xi = X /Ei. There is a canonical bijection between X /EI
and Πj ∈ IXj. By lemma 9 and Bourbaki (1965, I.5.4, Prop 6 and corollary to Prop.
7), this bijection is a homeomorphism. Thus Ri and Wi induce relations with
closed graph on Πj ∈ IXj . These induced relations also satisfy the other hypotheses
of lemma 8. The conclusion of this lemma is derived by composing the canonical
surjection of X onto Πj ∈ IXj with the functions from Πj ∈ IXj to R that lemma 8
asserts to exist. 
8. Publicity of cardinal intrapersonal interest comparisons
Conditions (23) and (24) still have to derived. In combination with (22), condi-
tion (23) states that, when one agent cares about the interest of another at all, then
he strictly prefers an increase in the interest of that agent if the interests of others
are held constant. Condition (24) states that agents’ preferences reflect agreement
about the cardinal magnitudes of intrapersonal interest differences between states.
(Note that this as an assertion of coincidence between various agents’ subjective
preferences regarding relevant sets of social states. It is not being asserted that there
is any objective basis for making interpersonal comparisons of either preferences or
interests.) Thus, both of these conditions are substantive ones.
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The assumptions that have been made so far are insufficient to guarantee either
of these conditions. However, both conditions can be derived if the assumption (27)
that will be stated below is added to those already made. The assumption states
(in the context of (4)) that agents’ preference relations reflect agreement about the
directions and relative magnitudes of pairs of interest differences, so evidently it is
necessary for (22), (23), and (24) to hold. The statement of (27) will be simplified
by the following lemma.
Lemma 11. If assumptions (2), (10), (11), and (22) hold, then ∀i i ∈ N(i) and
(26) j ∈ N(i) ⇐⇒ ∃x ∃y [xPiy and ∀h 6= j xEhy].
Proof. If j 6∈ N(i) and ∀h 6= j xEhy, then (22) implies that xIiy. Thus, if xPiy
and ∀h 6= j xEhy, then j ∈ N(i). By (2) and (11), this implication entails that
i ∈ N(i). The converse implication follows from (15) and the nonconstancy and
compatibility assertions of (22). If j ∈ N(i), then there exist states w and z such
that uij(w) > uij(z). By (10), there are states x and y such that xEjw, yEjz, and
∀h 6= j xEhy. These states therefore satisfy xPiy, as well. 
Now the ordinal assumption regarding publicity of cardinal intrapersonal interest
comparisons can be stated. For brevity, this assumption will be called interest
cardinality.
(27) Let N(i) be defined by (26). Suppose that j ∈ N(h) ∩ N(i). Then the
following implication holds for all states wh, wi, xh, xi, yh, yi, zh, and zi
satisfying whEjwi, xjEjxi, yhEjyi, zhEjzi, and ∀g 6= j [whEgxh, wiEgxi,
yhEgzh and yiEgzi]: if whRhyh, zhRhxh, and yiRiwi, then ziRixi.
To understand this assumption, think of agents h and i as forming their prefer-
ences by weighing interest gains to agent j against interest losses to other agents.
Agent h judges that j’s gain moving from wh to yh would not outweigh others’
losses but that j’s gain moving from xh to zh would at least balance others’ losses.
Since others’ interest is the same in wh as in xh and also in yj as in zh, h must
judge that j gains at least as much by moving from xh to zh as by moving from
wh to yh. If i shares this judgment, then he should also judge that j gains at least
as much by moving from xi to zi as by moving from wi to yi, since j has the same
interest in each of the ‘i’ states as in the corresponding ‘h’ state. If i also judges
that j’s gain moving from wi to yi is sufficient to balance others’ losses, then he
should judge as well that j’s gain in moving from xi to zi is sufficient to balance
others’ losses, as the conclusion of (27) reflects.
Lemma 12. If (2), (10), (11), (22) and (27) hold and j ∈ N(i), then uij is strictly
increasing in Vj . That is, under these hypotheses (23) holds and vj = uij satisfies
(14) for j.
Proof. First, in (27) substitute w for wh and wi, x for xh and xi, y for yh and
yi, and z for zh and zi. Next substitute j for i, i for h, and x for w and y. The
resulting statement is the implication that, if zRix and ∀g 6= j xEgz, then zRjx.
Now, consider any states x and w such that xVjw. By (10) there exists z such that
wEjz and ∀g 6= j xEgz. Note that xVjz, so that xPjz by (2) and therefore xPiz
by (27) (using the substitutions that have just been made). Therefore by (22),
uij(x) > uij(z) = uij(w). 
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Now the affine-relation condition (24) can be studied. The first step is to derive
from (24) a condition that resembles (27) more closely.
Lemma 13. If (2), (10), (11), (22) and (27) hold and j ∈ N(h) ∩ N(i), but (24)
does not hold, then there exist states x, y, and z such that xVjy, yVjz, and
(28) [uhj(y)− yhj(z)] / [uhj(x)− uhj(z)] 6= [uij(y)− uij(z)] / [uij(x)− uij(z)].
Proof. Consider any states r and s such that rVjs. Define a function f : X → R by
f(t) = uij(s) + {[uij(r) − uij(s)] / [uhj(r) − uhj(s)]} [uhj(t)− uhj(s)].
Note that the denominator of the fraction in the expression is nonzero by lemma
12, and that f(t) = uij(t) for t = r, s. If (24) does not hold, then there must be
some other state t such that f(t) 6= uij(t), and it is impossible that tEjr or tEjs.
Let x, y, and z be r, s, and t arranged in order of decreasing interest afforded to j.
The conclusion of the lemma is obtained by noting that
[uhj(y)− uhj(z)] / [uhj(x)− uhj(z)] = [f(y)− f(z)] / [f(x)− f(z)],
that uij (t) 6= f(t) for exactly one of the values t = x, y, z, and that [a− c] / [b− c]
is strictly monotone in each of its variables on {(a, b, c) | a > b > c}. 
Lemma 14. Suppose that (2), (6), (10), (11) and (27) hold that j ∈ N(h)∩N(i),
where h and i are distinct agents. Suppose that each of N(h) and N(i) contains an
element distinct from j. Then (24) holds with respect to j.
Proof. Consider any three states x, y, and z such that xVjy and yVjz. To simplify
notation, it will be assumed without loss of generality that j is neither h nor i.10 Let
rhVhsh and riVisi, as guaranteed by (11). Choose any natural number n sufficiently
large so that
(29)
uhj(x)− uhj(z) < n [uhh(rh)− uhh(sh)] and
uij(x)− uij(z) < n [uii(ri)− uii(si)].
Because the functions uhh and uii are continuous and X is connected, there exist
th and ti such that uhj(x) − uhj(z) = n [uhh(th) − uhh(sh)] and uij(x) − uij(z) =
n [uii(ti)−uii(si)]. Now, because uhj is continuous and X is connected, there exists
a function ηn : {0, 1, . . . , n} → X such that, for m ≤ n, uhj(ηn(m)) = uhj(z) +
m [uhj(th) − uhj(sh)]. (In particular, this implies that ηn(0)Ejz and ηn(n)Ejx.)
Assumption (27) will now be used to show that, for all m ≤ n, uij(ηn(m)) =
uij(z) + m [uij(ti) − uij(si)]. Since ηn(0)Ejz and ηn(n)Ejx, this is equivalent to
∀m < n uij(ηn(m+1)) − uij(ηn(m)) = uij(ti) − uij(si). Suppose, to the contrary,
that uij(ηn(m+1))− uij(ηn(m)) 6= uij(ti)− uij(si) for somem < n.Without loss of
generality, suppose that uij(ηn(m+1)) − uij(ηn(m)) < uij(ti) − uij(si). Then, for
some p, uij(ηn(p+1))−uij(ηn(p)) > uij(ti)−uij(si). (Otherwise uij(z)−uij(x) =∑
k<n [uij(ηn(k + 1))− uij(ηn(k))] < n [uij(ti − uij(si)].) Now, using (10), states
wh, wi, xh, xi, yh, yi, zh, and zi will be specified that satisfy the hypotheses of
(27). Here, when a state is subscripted by ‘g’, the subscript takes both values h
and i. The subscript ‘f ’ takes all values except j and the value taken by g in the
10This entails that h and i are elements of N(h) and N(i), respectively, that are distinct from
j. In general, agents h′ ∈ N(h) and i′ ∈ N(i) will have to be specified that are distinct from j.
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same expression. (That is, ‘f ’ can always take any value except h, i, and j, and it
can take whichever of {h, i} is not taken by g.) Let q be a fixed, arbitrary state.
Suppose that wgEjηn(p), xgEjηn(m), ygEjηn(p + 1), and zgEjηn(m + 1); that
wgEgtg, xgEgtg, ygEgsg, and zgEgsg; and that wgEf q, xgEfq, ygEfq, and zgEfq.
With respect to the states so specified, (27), fails to hold if (22) holds. Since
this contradicts the hypothesis of the lemma, ∀m ≤ n uij(ηn(m)) = uij(z) +
(m/n) [uij(x) − uij(z)].
For any n large enough to satisfy (29), there is a natural number µn < n satisfy-
ing ηn(µn + 1)Vjy and yWjηn(µn). Thus both [uhj(y)− uhj(z)] / [uhj(x)− uhj(z)]
and [uij(y) − uij(z)] / [uij(x) − uij(z)] are in the interval [µn / n, (un + 1) / n).
Since n can be arbitrarily large, [uhj(y) − uhj(z)] / [uhj(x) − uhj(z)] = [uij(y) −
uij(z)] / [uij(x) − uij(z)]. Therefore (24) holds, by lemma 13. 
Lemma 15. If conditions (2), (6), (10), (11), (22) and (27) hold, then condition
(24) holds for all agents h, i, and j.
Proof. In view of lemma 14, (24) only has to be established now in the case that
h = j, N(j) = {j} and j ∈ N(i) for some i 6= j. In that case, simply take uhj = uij
for some i satisfying j ∈ N(i). 
The foregoing lemmas immediately establish the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Suppose that assumptions (1)–(6), (10)–(13), (25) and (27) are satis-
fied, and that either (7) is satisfied or else X possesses the cartesian-product struc-
ture described in lemma 7. Then Pareto superiority and liberal succession coincide.
9. An alternative cardinality condition on preferences
Within many communities there is wide, if approximate agreement, regarding
cardinal intrapersonal comparisons of interest. It is uncontroversial that someone’s
interest would be more significantly advanced if he were to move from a hovel to
a decent house than if he were to move from the house to a mansion, for example.
The prevalence of this kind of shared intuition about welfare contributes to the
plausibility of condition (27).
However, some people may find it less plausible that there is public agreement
about intrapersonal cardinal interest comparisons, than that there is public agree-
ment about intrapersonal cardinal preference comparisons.11 For one thing, it is
often more obvious what people prefer than what is objectively good for them. For
another, people who endorse expected-utility theory are already committed to ac-
cept one form of the cardinality of persons’ preferences, even if they do not accept
the cardinality of persons’ interests. People who hold these views may prefer to
assume the publicity of intrapersonal cardinal preference comparisons rather than
to assume (27). It will be shown here that such an assumption can be formulated
in a way similar to (27), and that the formal assumption (together with the other
axioms) implies the existence of common additive interest factors.
Consider how to express the agreement of two agents, j and k, about intrap-
ersonal cardinal preference comparisons concerning agent i. Suppose that ∀h 6∈
{i, j} [wIhy and xIhz], and that wEjy and xEjz. Make an analogous assumption
11I am indebted to Arthur Robson for stating the two considerations that I discuss now.
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with k substituted for j, but with respect to a different set of social states. Specif-
ically, suppose that ∀h 6∈ {i, k} [w′Ihy′ and x′Ihz′], and that w′Ejy′ and x′Ejz′.
Let i be indifferent between the corresponding social states mentioned in these two
assumptions. That is, let wIiw
′, xIix
′, yIiy
′, and zIiz
′.
Now suppose that xRjw, yRjz, and w
′Rkx
′. By reasoning analogous to that
regarding (27), the two preferences of j imply that j must regard i’s interest gain
from being in x rather than w as being at least as great as i’s interest gain from
being in z rather than y would be. The preference of k implies that k must regard
i’s interest gain from being in x′ rather than w′ as being insufficient to outweigh
strictly the net disadvantages of x′ relative to w′ for everyone else. (Note that these
will be in terms of preference for everyone except k, and in terms of interest for
k.) Thus, if k agrees with j about intrapersonal cardinal preference comparisons
regarding i, then k should also regard i’s interest gain from being in z′ rather than
y′ as being insufficient to outweigh strictly the net disadvantages of z′ relative to
y′ for everyone else. That is, it should be the case that y′Rkz
′.
The implication from these various assumptions to their conclusion jointly consti-
tute the assumption that intrapersonal cardinal preference comparisons are public:
(30) Define j ∈ S(i) if and only if, for some states x and y, xEiy, ∀h 6∈ {i, j}
xIhy, and xPhy. If j ∈ S(h) ∩ S(i), then following implications holds for all
states wh, wi, xh, xi, yh, yi, zh, and zi satisfying whIjwi, xhIjxi, yhIjyi,
zhIjzi, ∀g 6∈ {h, j} [whIgxh and yhIgzh], ∀g 6∈ {i, j} [wiIgxi and yiIgzi],
whEhxh, yhEhzh, wiEixi, and yiEizi: if whRhyh, zhRhxh, and yiRiwi,
then ziRixi.
It seems very plausible that this condition can play an analogous role to (27)
in guaranteeing the coincidence of Pareto superiority and liberal succession on the
basis of ordinal and topological assumptions.
10. Coincidence without separability or publicity
Theorem 2 and the alternative just suggested each hypothesize (a) product struc-
ture of interests and separability of preferences in interests, and (b) public agree-
ment regarding some form of intrapersonal cardinal comparison. The standard
construction of nonpaternalistic preferences, by beginning with cardinal interest-
representation functions as in theorem 1, yields a family of preferences that satisfy
all of these qualitative hypotheses. Although the example provided in section 3 has
shown that the hypotheses of interest-determination and nonpaternalism alone are
too broad to characterize the class of nonunanimous preference profiles on which
the liberal principle and unanimity coincide, it might well be suspected that the
additional qualitative hypotheses would prove to be necessary as well as sufficient
for this coincidence. A counterexample that disproves this conjecture is now pro-
vided.12
Let there be three agents, I = {1, 2, 3}, and let X = R3+. Define
(31) vi(x) = xi,
12This example will involve preferences that are represented by utility functions defined by
taking the minimum of several numbers. Such utility functions are pointwise limits of sequences
of CES utility functions. Every CES utility function represents a preference relation satisfying the
separability assumption. Thus, despite the example there may still be a close connection between
separability and the coincidence of the two welfare relations.
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and define
(32) pi(x) = min {xi/2, xj , xk}, where I = {i, j, k}.
Then define Wi and Ri as in (14) and (15).
It is evident from (31) and (32) that agents’ preferences are determined by in-
terests, and that the agents are not unanimous. It will now be shown that their
preferences are also nonpaternalistic and that the relation of liberal succession co-
incides with that of Pareto improvement. Since the latter claim implies the former,
only the coincidence of the two welfare orderings needs to be shown. Recall that
every Pareto improvement is automatically a liberal successor, so it is sufficient to
establish the converse inclusion.
Suppose, then, that y is a liberal successor of x. Specifically, suppose that
(33) ∀i ∈ C pi(y) ≥ pi(x),
that
(34) ∀j 6∈ C y ≥ x,
and that
(35) pk(x) > pk(y).
By (35), y is not a Pareto improvement over x. This will be shown to be a contra-
diction.
By (32) and (35),
(36) min {yi, yj , yk/2} < min {xi, xj , xk/2}.
By (32) and (35),k 6∈ C, so yk ≥ xk by (34). Therefore (36) implies that, for one of
the other agents h ∈ {i, j},
(37) yh = min {yi, yj , yk/2} < min {xi, xj , xk/2} ≤ xh.
Therefore h ∈ C by (34). But, by (32) and (37),
(38) ph(y) ≤ yh/2 < min {xh/2, xi, xj , xk} = ph(x).
Therefore h 6∈ C by (33), so a contradiction has been reached. This establishes
that liberal succession coincides with Pareto improvement, and consequently that
all agents have nonpaternalistic preferences.
However, agents’ preferences are not separable in interests, and cardinal inter-
personal comparisons of neither preferences nor interests are public. To see that
the preferences of agent 1 are inseparable, let J = {1} and K = {2, 3}, and de-
fine w = (1, 2, 2), x = (2, 2, 2), y = (1, 0, 0), and z = (2, 0, 0). Then (4) fails to
hold because, although its hypothesis holds, xP1w while yR1z. By the symmetry of
the example, the preferences of the other two agents are not separable in interests
either.
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To show that intrapersonal cardinal interest comparisons are not public, let
i = 1 and j = 2 in (27). Define w = z = (3, 2, 2) and x = y = (2, 2, 2). Then the
hypothesis of (27) holds, but wR1x and not yR1z, so the conclusion of (27) fails to
hold. Therefore (27) (which is an implication) fails to hold.
Intrapersonal cardinal preference comparisons can similarly be shown not to be
public. To do so, let i = 1, j = 2, and k = 3 in (30), and define: w = z = (3, 3, 3),
x = y = (2, 3, 3), w′ = z′ = (3, 3, 7), and x′ = y′ = (2, 3, 7). These social states
have the feature that agents 1 and 2 always have “selfish” preferences among them
(that is, the preference and interest relations of each agent among these states
coincide), and that agent 3 has “selfish” preferences among {w, x, y, z} but has
totally “altruistic” preferences for the interest of agent 1 among {w′, x′, y′, z′}.
From these considerations, it can easily be seen that (30) fails to hold.
11. Examples and conclusion
Strictly speaking, Mill’s principle concerns only the permissibility of private ac-
tivities. Contemporary libertarians advocate that public authorities should not
have the power to take any action that Mill’s principle would prohibit to the coali-
tion of persons who prefer the action. Such a position obviously has strong dis-
tributive implications. An alternative view would hold that public authorities can
legitimately take some actions that would be prohibited to private persons and
coalitions, but would also recognize that public actions should be structured in a
way that will minimize “transactions costs.” On this view, the public authorities
should not take an action if some person or coalition can propose an alternative
action that the liberal principle would endorse as a replacement for the initially
contemplated action. Such a view implicitly defines a notion of “liberal efficiency”
that is analogous to the familiar concept of Pareto efficiency.
On this latter normative view about government action, there is a broad scope
for welfare analysis but the familiar Paretian analysis is foundationally inadequate.
There are several issues in public finance, with respect to which such a view seems
to be widely held. One of these issues is whether redistributive policy ought to
be implemented by cash transfers or by transfers in kind (e.g., provision of public
housing). One of the common arguments in favor of cash transfers is that it is
demeaning to the recipients of transfers not to be granted autonomy over the use
of the resources that society is willing to transfer.13 This argument makes an
implicit appeal to the liberal principle. It is clear that some of the proponents
of the argument regard it as being conceptually distinct from the argument that
transfers in kind are inefficient, although those proponents (especially when they
are economists) typically produce the latter argument as a corollary. It might be
thought that there could be transfer programs with respect to which the argument
about recipients’ autonomy could be raised although cash transfers would not be
Pareto superior to transfers in kind. The results of this paper indicate the special
features that such a program would have to possess. In cases where such features
are absent, an efficient transfer never violates the preferences of recipients about
how the resources dedicated to them should be used.
It would be widely agreed that the assumptions about interests and preferences
that have been discussed here are reasonable ones to make in the context of an
13Conversely, one of the arguments sometimes made in favor of transfers in kind is that some
classes of recipients (e.g., addicts) are incapable of exercising such autonomy.
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evaluation of transfers to competent adults. The one assumption from which there
would possibly be substantial dissent is the additive separability of preferences in
interests. As was shown in the preceding section, this assumption will not be satis-
fied if people’s preferences reflect maximin considerations regarding the satisfaction
of interests. However, the example studied in that section makes it plausible that
the results proved here are robust to this specific kind of failure of the separability
assumption. This is a matter for further research. If these results are indeed robust,
then it will be fair to conclude that the welfare evaluation of transfers to competent
adults can safely focus on efficiency questions to the exclusion of questions about
liberal choice.14
Another issue concerns the regulation of markets for services such as education
or medical care. Because these services are differentiated products, it is conceiv-
ably efficient to limit the number of product varieties in order to take advantage of
economies of scale. Suppose, for simplicity, that any feasible allocation involving
production of more than one product variety is Pareto dominated by some feasible
allocation in which only a single variety is produced. Thus, according to either the
efficiency criterion or the liberal criterion, only an allocation with a single variety
can be optimal. The question is, which varieties may be produced in optimal allo-
cations? Parallel to the case of transfers just discussed, the answer to this question
is the same for both criteria if the assumptions studied in this paper hold. Also
parallel to that case, the appropriateness of separability and cardinality assump-
tions is open to question on account of features of the situation to which the results
of this paper plausibly are robust. However, in the case of differentiated-product
allocation, there are also intrinsic difficulties about the publicity of intrapersonal
cardinal interest comparisons. That is, the failure of the cardinality assumption to
hold may not be simply a by-product of a violation of the separability assumption.
To understand the nature of these possible intrinsic difficulties, consider some of
the troublesome and divisive questions about resource allocation in education and
medicine. How much emphasis should schools give to the development of students’
skills in reading and arithmetic, versus the development of critical thinking and
appreciation of the arts? How much of medical research funding should be spent
on finding cures for rare diseases that strike people early in life, versus common
diseases of older people? Debates about these questions have to do partly with
distributional issues, but they also reflect pronounced differences in the participants’
views about the relative importance of disparate elements of the good life. That is,
they reflect the fact that participants are (at least implicitly) expressing cardinal
judgments about the components of persons’ interests, and that they disagree about
those judgments although their ordinal judgments may be unanimous. It is not at
all clear whether the results of this paper can be extended to cover situations that
possess this complication.
These examples illuminate the philosophical significance of the technical results
that have been derived here. These results constitute a limited defense of the study
14It might still be argued that there is something ethically preferable about letting recipients
make their own choices, rather than making choices for them that are consistent with their pref-
erences. Nevertheless, this argument does not seem as compelling as an argument that people’s
preferences about matters that are their own business are actually being thwarted. For example,
most people would judge that rather small reductions of administrative cost constitute sufficient
grounds to justify centralized allocation if the result is consistent with recipients’ preferences.
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of the unanimity relation in welfare analysis to address concerns that may funda-
mentally be about respect for persons’ objective interests. This defense acknowl-
edges the legitimacy of these concerns, but argues that they actually are addressed,
even though implicitly, by the technically simpler efficiency analysis. Following
Mill, a theoretical concept of a person’s non-preferential interest has been intro-
duced in order to relate the specification of rights and liberties to the specification
of preferences. While there may be many possible ways to give a substantive def-
inition of this concept, only a few qualitative assumptions about the concept are
needed in order to make the defense. For the most part, these assumptions seem
to be appropriate for the discussion of distributional issues and of other issues with
which applied welfare analysis typically deals. A formal example has shown that
the assumption that is likely to be regarded as the most restrictive one, separability,
may be stronger than is actually needed. The two economic examples that have
just been discussed show that, even if this conjecture is true, the limited defense
of the unanimity criterion falls short of showing that explicit consideration of the
liberal criterion would be completely dispensable for applied welfare analysis.
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